German-Jewish Internal Politics under Hitler 1933 - 1938 (Part A)
Source: J. Boas, German-Jewish Internal Politics under Hitler 1933-1938", in: Leo Baeck Institute Yearbook , 1984, pp. 3-25.
'They can condemn us to hunger but they cannot condemn us to starvation.'
This declaration, capturing all the pathos of the Jewish position in the early days of the Hitler regime, appeared in the 6th April issue of the C.V Zeitung , German Jewry's most widely disseminated newspaper.* Sandwiched between the anti-Jewish boycott of 1st April 1933 and the publication of the non-Aryan laws less than a week later, it came from Ismar Elbogen, the dean of Jewish historians, and ambiguous as Elbogen's sentiment may seem today, in that uncertain era when Jews could hardly believe that the first steps had been taken which were to lead to stripping them of every mark of civilised existence, the strange mixture of resignation and optimism sounded neither naive nor unfounded. As no one knew what the future might bring, it was impossible to determine what end the anti-Jewish Nazi policy might serve.
For the moment, the most pessimistic interpretations seemed to have been exaggerated. Following the boycott of the 1st April and the non-Aryan legislation the worst appeared to be over. These two initial stimuli intended to eject Germany's Jews from the national body failed to live up to the expectations of the antisemites. The Law for the Restoration of the Professional Civil Service, for example, was enforced only at the higher levels and did not affect the greater number of Jews (who had already been effectively barred from the higher ranks). One estimate put the number of Jews dismissed over a six-year period at 5,433; these included teachers and university professors, who in Germany were considered part of the civil service 1 . In addition, despite persecution and the Law against the Overcrowding of German Schools (25th April 1933), which introduced a numerus clausus for Jews in the general German school system, a large number of Jews continued to frequent German schools. As late as May 1938, twenty-five percent of all Jewish school children were still attending non-Jewish schools. A year before the percentage had stood at 38.7 2 . And although the Law Regarding Admittance to the Profession of Law threatened non-Aryan lawyers with the loss of their practices, it was not until 27th September 1938 (Fifth Ordinance to the Reich Citizenship Law) that all Jewish lawyers were disbarred and reduced to "consultants".
The boycott, like the non-Aryan legislation, failed to deliver on its promise. Not the least among that policy's disabling factors was the consideration that the complete elimination of the Jews from the economy would have spelled disaster, as was well noted by the representatives of big business in Hitler's government. The presence of von Hindenburg and the possible repercussions of foreign opinion were still sufficiently important at the time in soft-pedalling the more restrictive aspects of the campaign.* A notable lack of enthusiasm was actually detectable among the masses, and some opposition was even registered in the press and radio 3 . What is more, some Jewish firms seem to have substantially benefited from the Nazi take over and the restoration of something resembling economic normalcy. Jewish clothing and textile manufacturers were given contracts for supplying the armed services, and at the beginning of 1938 there were nearly 40,000 Jewish-owned firms still doing business in Germany, some with important functions in the rearmament and import trade 4 . A social historian of the Third Reich summed up: 'Despite boycotts many Jewish shopkeepers managed to stay in business until 1938, a year in which some of them were actually beginning to experience boom conditions' 5 .
That same year, however, dubbed by Hitler "The Year of Understanding", witnessed a gruelling series of persecutions. From imposed changes of name to the brutal evacuation of Polish Jews residing in Germany,** the persecution mounted in intensity, reaching its peak in the pogrom of the 10th/11th November, the Kristallnacht .
Evidently, until the end of 1938, National Socialism had no fixed plans for the Jews 6 . Lacking authoritative direction, the Jewish Question became from the very beginning a popular subject to engage the attention of ambitious Party members. Those Nazis spoiling to widen their influence could point with contempt to the failure of the radicals in carrying through the boycott. At the same time, Hitler's control over Jewish policy would not make itself felt again until after the Kristallnacht 7 , and into this void stepped a less extreme faction - advocates of "dissimulation," i.e., the legal confinement of Jews to their own sphere, backed by such government ministers as Hjalmar Schacht and Count Schwerin von Krosigk, Hitler's Finance Minister; the Nuremberg Laws of September 1935 seemed to bear out the moderate position, even to the significant neglecting to mention economic apartheid.
But the period in which a centrally directed Jewish policy was absent came to an end in 1938 when the radicals again seized the initiative. Moderates like Schacht, War Minister von Blomberg and Commander-in-Chief von Fritsch were driven from office, as the regime could confidently boast of a string of victories, not the least of, which was an upsurge in the economy. Goebbels's failure to exploit the November pogrom resulted in a dimming of his image in the Nazi hierarchy, and thus it was into the hands of Goering that were gathered the reins of a sharper, that is, more clearly, more pointedly, co-ordinated Jewish policy 8 .
The ambiguous position of German Jewry in the years 1933-1938 was not solely the result of the improvised nature of Nazi Jewish policy. Far more unbalancing was the illusion fostered by this policy that the nation's Jews might be allowed to fill their own place, with a specific autonomy, within the overall German national context. It is impossible to say whether National Socialist leaders ever seriously entertained such plans, but the fact remains that in the period 1933-1938 they did little to demolish the hopes many Jews had placed in its eventuality. Bolstering Jewish optimism were a number of factors tending to underline this belief. For instance, Jews experienced little or no interference with their school system. Besides being responsible for teaching the curriculum in force in German schools, they were allowed to complement the standard courses with their own material; private Jewish schools even continued to receive state subsidies until March 1939 9 . Officially there were no efforts made to prevent Jews from synchronising their occupational patterns with those prevailing in the non-Jewish community 10 . Jews were not hindered in the practice of their religion, nor in the functions of their institutions: when in September 1933 they established the Reichsvertretung der deutschen Juden to represent their interests with the Nazi authorities the procedure involved a simple act of registration with the Ministry of the Interior 11 .
Similarly, Jewish cultural work was not only left unmolested but actually received encouragement from the Nazi bureaucracy. On l6th June 1933, the Prussian Ministry of Science, Art and Popular Enlightenment approved the formation of the Kulturbund deutscher Juden - 'because the members of the Jewish race', declared the Ministry's Cultural Adviser Hans Hinkel, 'being foreigners, deserve every opportunity for creative expression' 12 . Two years later, as the arbiter of Jewish cultural affairs in Goebbels's Propaganda Ministry, Hinkel supervised the coordination of Jewish cultural activities in one roof organisation empowered to negotiate Jewish cultural matters, the Reichsverband der juedischen Kulturbuende 13 .
The argument for autonomy was two-way. On the Jewish side, it found a skilled dialectician in Robert Weltsch, the editor of the Zionist newspaper, the Juedische Rundschau . Jews no less than Germans, argued Weltsch before the relevant authorities at the Propaganda Ministry, should have the opportunity to express theibeing, an end which could best be served, he suggested, by leaving the Jewish press, the press by and for Jews, relatively undisturbed 14 Whatever his Nazi audience may have thought of Weltsch's line of reasoning, it is certain that during the first five years of Nazi rule Jewish journalism by and large continued to function independently 15 . Which is not to say that it was altogether free from government interference. On the contrary, there was "constant supervision" and Nachzensur - "after-censorship" rather than outright censorship. The editors of the community's publications could never be sure of the ground under their feet. They not only had to select their subject matter with the utmost circumspection, if the message was to clear Nazi check-points it had to be couched in a special language, "the secret language of the persecuted". But as language of this sort, designed to keep the authorities at bay, leaves the field wide open to misinterpretation, the reader, especially today's reader, must approach it greatly forearmed with caution and understanding.
The comparatively free hand left to Jews in the conduct of their own affairs also extended to the sphere of intramural politics. Never dormant in the community, politics in the pre-1933 era had steadily been pushing inward from its position at the perimeter of Jewish life towards its centre, particularly in Berlin where political conflict was more pronounced than elsewhere in the Reich 16 . Still, the substance of politics conspired to keep political strife within reasonable bounds. Rarely were Jewish politicians required to break new ground. Politics was an affair of the rich and well-to-do, of those with academic degrees and business pedigrees.
As it no longer was "politics as usual" in post-1933 Germany, so it no longer was "politics as usual" in the Jewish community. The problems and issues facing German Jewry in the pre-Hitler era - concerning Jewish schools, vocational training, religion and welfare - burst their conventional mould during the Nazi ascendancy, and resolute leadership to deal with far more serious problems was urgently required. But this question of who should direct and control Jewish life, and by what authority and principles, plunged the community into recurrent political strife - a bitter contest that did not disappear until the community itself had disappeared.
The struggle for supremacy in the Jewish community was between two forces: on one side were the advocates of the "German-Jewish way", bent on maintaining the status quo, while on the other were the growing ranks of the Zionist faithful, ideologically committed to a national, i.e. "racial", conception of Jewry and to the creation of a Jewish homeland in the Middle East.
In 1933 the Centralverein deutscher (CV) Staatsbuerger juedischen Glaubens , German Jewry's largest organisation, carried the standard of the "German-Jewish way", and the Zionitsische Vereinigung fuer Deutschland (ZVfD), the "general" Zionist organisation, that of the "national" Jews 17 . The former had its uneasy allies in the liberals (liberals both in the Jewish religious sense and in their German political attitudes) of the community administrations, who were everywhere in power; and the latter had its own similarly queasy supporters in these same ruling bodies, though everywhere in the minority.
Competition between Zionists and "assimilationists" 18 , Zionism's epithet for Centralverein (CV) followers, harked back to pre-Hitler days, when the Centralverein had easily maintained a dominant position. But with Hitler's victory conditions changed, and in the subsequent German-Jewish political history Zionism claimed for itself an ever greater share of power, basing its demand on the reputed failure of the pre-1933 liberal leaders to prepare Jews for the coming of Nazism. The day after Hitler's appointment the ZVfD's newspaper, Juedische Rundschau , wrote that the struggle for Jewish rights could only be waged by those whose commitment to Jewish Volkstum had always been beyond reproach, to wit, the Zionists 19 . The members of the ruling clique, Zionists asserted, did not even pretend to be devoted to Judaism: money and the claim of being "better Germans" had lifted them to political office 20 . Blinded by their liberal shibboleths, misunderstanding Jewish destiny, they had washed their hands of the Jewish Question. Hopelessly set in their ways, hidebound in their beliefs, they had ridiculed the creative force of nationalism, interfered with the construction of Palestine 21 , and dragged their feet on the problems of Jewish schools and occupational retraining. In short, the Zionist indictment concluded, these leaders were the "ewig Gestrigen" 22 , perennially behind the times, incorrigible purveyors of the old "apologetic-assimilationist dialectic" 23 .
Zionists made up for years of being slighted; for the paltry allocations to their schools and Hechaluz 24 , the Zionist instrument which prepared young Jews for a life of labour in Palestine, and for the anti-Zionist resolutions in the Centralverein , (CV) (the last one as late as 1928). Its ranks swollen with the so-called "March Zionists" (meaning those Jews who had hurriedly crossed over to Zionism in the wake of Hitler's election victory in early March), the ZVfD now aspired to complete mastery of the Jewish community. By mid-1935, encouraged by the pro-Zionist bent of Nazi Jewish policy 25 , the ZVfD considered itself the legitimate spokesman for all German Jewry. At its convention held in Berlin during the first week of May it unanimously adopted a resolution which boldly proclaimed: 'The Zionist movement in Germany demands the right to influence decisively the entire Jewish life in Germany' 26 . It would not be Zionism's final bid for power. But the Centralverein , as the dominant political power in the community, not only faced attack from "national" Jews; it also had to contend with "national" German Jews, with assailants to its right. On 30th May 1933 Jewish Berliners' were privy to a strange sight. On large advertising pillars usually cluttered with Nazi propaganda, the membership of the Centralverein was branded for conspiring with the ZVfD to lead German Jewry back to the ghetto 27 . The posters, urging "Join us!", had been put up by the Verband nationaldeutscher Juden , a small band of extreme Jewish German nationalists led by Max Naumann.
A Berlin lawyer and a recipient of the Iron Cross First and Second Class, Naumann was wont to indict those Jews whose "Germanness", as he put it, did not 'fill their entire being' 28 . Characteristically, in 1933 his Verband launched the Aktionsausschuss der juedischen Deutschen to defend Germany against "atrocity propaganda" from abroad. The Committee, promoting a resurgent and aggressive national Germany 29 , was joined by three other groups whose perfervid nationalism ranked second to none: the Reichsbund Juedischer Frontsoldaten (R.j.F.), the Deutscher Vortrupp , Gefolgschaft deutscher Juden , and the youth formation Schwarzes Faehnlein 30 .
The life of the Aktionsausschuss was unusually short. Two months after its inception in April 1933, a leadership quarrel led to a parting of the ways between the Verband and the numerically far superior Reichsbund . The other groups quickly followed suit, leaving the Naumann association to fend for itself until the end of 1935 when the Gestapo suppressed both the Verband and the Vortrupp .
But for Nazi antisemitism, many of the followers of the Verband nationaldeutscher Juden and perhaps all of those in the Deutscher Vortrupp would have made inspired National Socialists. Certainly much less extreme but likewise committed to rescuing Jews from the Scylla of the Centralverein and the Charybdis of the ZVfD was the short-lived Erneuerungsbewegung der juedischen Deutschen . Led by Bruno Woyda, an official of the Berlin Executive and former editor of the Juedisch-Liberale Zeitung , Woyda made use of that paper's 13th November 1933 issue to publicise his movement's program. Appealing for an end to inaction and indecision, the Renewal Movement urged the re-awakening of German-Jewish conscio, which it identified as a cross between the soldierly virtues of the Jewish front-fighter - simplicity and comradeship - and the honesty and spontaneity of the Youth Movement. In closing, the Renewal Movement exhorted all Jews sincere in their devotion to Germany to unite behind a "German-feeling leadership" 31
.
The Erneuerungsbewegung found little support among Jews. The Jewish press blamed it for contributing to that very divisiveness its existence was meant to cure 32 , and though the movement continued to exist until 1935, little more was heard of it after December 1933
References:
*I want to thank Dr. Arnold Paucker for his helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article; also Alicia K. Wicks for her generous assistance.
1.) G. Warburg, Six Years of Hitler. The Jews under the Nazi Regime , London 1939, p. 59.
2.) S. Adler-Rudel, Juedische Selbsthilfe unter dem Naziregime 1933ΓÇô1939 im Spiegel der Berichte der Reichsvertretung der Juden in Deutschland , Tuebingen 1974 (Schriftenreihe wissenschaftlicher Abhandlungen des Leo Baeck Instituts 29), pp. 28, 30.
*For foreign reaction ( viz the USA) see the following essay by Deborah E. Lipstadt, The American Press and the Persecution of German Jewry', in this volume of the Year BookΓÇô(Ed.). LBI Year Book XXIX (1984).
3.) See Herbert Freeden, Vom geistigen Widerstand der deutschen Juden. Ein Kapitel juedischer Selbstbehauptung in den Jahren 1933/1938 , Jerusalem 1963, pp. 5ΓÇô6.
For the economics of the boycott, see Helmut Genschel, Die Verdraengung der Juden aus der Wirtschaft im Dritten Reich , Goettingen 1966, pp. 59, 64, 73ΓÇô80. Genschel points out, for example, that Jewish-owned department stores, the butt of so much propaganda, continued doing business; the giant Hermann Tietz concern in June 1933 even received a subsidy of 14.5 million RM. Genschel also noted that many card-carrying Nazis openly flouted Party directives against shopping in "Jewish" department stores. Ibid. , p. 123.
4.) Lucy S. Dawidowicz, The War against the Jews 1933ΓÇô1945 , New York 1975, pp. 82, 96. Citing figures furnished by the Frankfurter Zeitung , the newspaper of the Zionistische Vereinigung fuer Deutschland reported at the end of 1935 that ladies' apparel was still about 50% in Jewish handsΓÇôin Berlin, roughly 80%ΓÇôwhile the Jewish share of the capital's market in men's clothing had dropped only about 10% from the pre-Hitler days, from 70% to 60%.
5.) Richard Grunberger, The 12-Year Reich. A Social History of Nazi Germany , New York-Chicago-San Francisco 1971, p. 457.
**See the contribution by Sybil Milton, The Expulsion of Polish Jews from Germany: October 1938 to July 1939', in this section of the current volume of the Year Book ΓÇô (Ed.). LBI Year Book XXIX (1984).
6.) For Nazi Jewish policy, see Karl A. Schleunes, The Twisted Road to Auschwitz. Nazi Policy Towards German Jews 1933ΓÇô1939 , London 1970.Uwe Dietrich Adam, Judenpolitik im Dritten Reich , Duesseldorf 1972.
7.) Schleunes, op. cit. , p. 216.
8.) Raul Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews , Chicago 1961, p. 23. See also, Ernst Marcus, The German Foreign Office and the Palestine Question in the Period 1933ΓÇô1939', Yad Vashem Studies on the European Jewish Catastrophe and Resistance , II (1958) p. 194; and Schleunes: "In the final analysis, the Kristallnacht was the product of the lack of co-ordination which marked Nazi planning on Jewish policy and the result of a last-ditch effort by the radicals to wrest over this policy." Op. cit. , p. 236.
9.) E. C. Helmreich, Jewish Education in the Third Reich', in Journal of Central European Affairs , XV (July 1955), No. 2, pp. 141, 144. For Jewish schools under Hitler, see also Hans Gaertner, Problems of Jewish Schools in Germany during the Hitler Regime (With Special Reference to the Theodor Herzl Schule in Berlin)', in LBI Year Book I (1956) pp. 123ΓÇô141.
10.) Though there was no official interference with Jewish efforts at occupational retraining, practical obstacles abounded. German employers, for example, were reluctant to hire Jewish apprentices or labourers, and since Jews could not purchase land, agricultural training was restricted to tiny holdings still in Jewish hands. Hence young Jews often had to go abroad for their agricultural training.
11.) Kurt Jakob Ball-Kaduri, Das Leben der Juden in Deutschland im Jahre 1933 , Frankfurt a. Main 1963, p. 41. There seems to be unanimous agreement that a great deal of real autonomy existed. Interview with Max Gruenewald, 14th October 1974, New York; interview with Herbert A. Strauss, 14th October 1974, New York; see also, K. Y. Ball-Kaduri, Evidence, its Value and Limitations', in Yad Vashem Studies on the European Jewish Catastrophe and Resistance , III (1959), p. 87.
12.) Quoted in Juedische Rundschau , XXXVIII (29th September 1933).
13.) See C.V Zeitung , XIV (9th May 1935). Juedische Rundschau , XXXX (20th August 1935). The Israelitisches Familienblatt , citing figures supplied by Hinkel, asserted that the Kulturbund had 110,000 members and 600 artists. Herbert Freeden noted that Hinkel was not unknown to intercede with the authorities on behalf of his Jewish charges; in the course of time, however, his control became stricter and stricter. Juedisches Theater in Nazideutschland , Tuebingen 1964 (Schriftenreihe wissenschaftlicher Abhandlungen des Leo Baeck Instituts 12), p. 40. What was true of Jewish cultural life was true of "autonomy" in general: it was always under the watchful eye of Gestapo supervision. For example, the Gestapo gradually began to attend the meetings of the decision-making bodies in the community and to demand written reports. Interview with Adolf Leschnitzer, 15th October 1974, New York. The Gestapo, wrote Kurt Tuchler, knew everything that was happening in the community. Erlebnisse und Beobachtungen in den ersten vier Hitlerjahren , 1945, in Yad Vashem Archives, Jerusalem, p. 3. Thus the leaders of the Centralverein deutscher Staatsbuerger juedischen Glaubens decided to discontinue their official meetings because no real work could be done in the presence of the Gestapo; they would meet "unofficially" in a private home instead, usually the Chairman's. Ernst Herzfeld, Meine letzten Jahre in Deutschland, 1933ΓÇô1938 , 1945, in: Yad Vashem Archives, Jerusalem, p. 2.
14.) Robert Weltsch , An der Wende des Modernen . Betrachtungenaus fuenf Jahrzehnten , Tuebingen 1972, Veroeffentlichung des Leo Baeck Instituts, p. 48.
15.) "In their relationship to Jewish papers the Nazi authorities were incalculable, and the real motives for their comparatively liberal attitude have not yet been discovered." Robert Weltsch, A Goebbels Speech and a Goebbels Letter', in LBI Year Book X (1965), p. 285. For the Jewish press under Nazism, see Margaret T. Edelheim-Muehsam, The Jewish Press in Germany', in LBI Year Book I (1956), pp. 163ΓÇô175 and, by the same author, Reactions of the Jewish Press to the Nazi Challenge', in LBI Year Book V (1960), pp. 309ΓÇô329.
16.) See Ernst Herzfeld, Meine letzten Jahre in Deutschland, op. cit. , p. 12. See also, Kurt Loewenstein, Die innerjuedische Reaktion auf die Krise der deutschen Demokratie', in Entscheidungsjahr 1932. Zur Judenfrage in der Endphase der Weimarer Republik , zweite revidierte und erweiterte Auflage. Ein Sammelband herausgegeben von Werner E. Mosse unter Mitwirkung von Arnold Paucker, Tuebingen 1966 (Schriftenreihe wissenschaftlicher Abhandlungen des Leo Baeck 13), pp. 400ΓÇô401. This article focuses on Berlin.
17.) "General" Zionists as opposed to the small group known as Staatszionisten in Germany and as Revisionists elsewhere. Revisionism, created in 1925 by Vladimir Jabotinsky, stood to the right of the general Zionism of the ZVfD, which supported Weizmann's policy of co-operation with England. Revisionism, on the other hand, believed in the use of violence to bring about a Jewish Palestine and was virulently anti-British. The leader of the Staatszionisten was Georg Kareski.
18.) Concerning the Jewish press in Germany from 1918 to 1938, Herbert A. Strauss wrote: "Its editorials and news columns reflected the major issues of each period, understanding them in the light of the two options availablto German Jewry in those fateful years, the Zionist and (what we may call for want of a better term) the German-Jewish mainstream' to which the derogatory term assimilationist' would apply only from the point of view of their opponents, not in their own eyes..." The Jewish Press in Germany, 1918ΓÇô1938 (1943)', p. 16. Dr. Straus kindly provided me with a rough English translation of this article, which appeared in Hebrew as Haitonuth hayehudit beGermania bishnim 1918ΓÇô1939 (1943)', in Itonut Yehudit shehayta , Yehuda Gothelf, ed., Tel-Aviv 1973.
19.) Juedische Rundschau , XXXVIII (31st January 1933).
20.) Juedische Rundschau , XXXVIII (16th June 1933); XXXX (12th February 1935).
21.) Juedische Rundschau , XXXVIII (29th March 1933).
22.) Juedische Rundschau , XXXVIII (21st July 1933); XXXX (12th March 1935).
23.) Juedische Rundschau , XXXVIII (25th July 1933).
24.) For example, in 1932 the liberals in the Berlin Assembly devoted only 2,000 RM for the Hechaluz . Juedische Rundschau , XXXXI (10th October 1936). To save money, in the early thirties these same liberals wanted to dismantle the Jewish elementary schools, which were a "thorn in their side". See Selma Schiratzky, Die Schule Rykestrasse' in Berlin, eine juedische Volksschule in der Hitlerzeit , 1956, in: Yad Vashem Archives, Jerusalem, p. 2.
25.) See below, pp. 19ΓÇô20 and notes 85 and 89.
26.) Juedische Rundschau , XXXX (7th May 1935).
27.) See C.V Zeitung , XII (1st June 1933).
28.) Max Naumann, Vom mosaischen und nicht mosaischen Juden , Berlin, 1921, p. 28.
29.) See Juedische Rundschau , XXXVIII (7th April 1933); Israelitisches Familienblatt , XXXV (6th April 1933). The full title of the Aktionsausschuss was: Aktionsausschuss der juedischen Deutschen gegen die anti-deutsche Hetze.
30.) According to Hans Joachim Schoeps, founder of the Deutscher Vortrupp , his organisation had about three hundred members. "Bereit fuer Deutschland!" Der Patriotismus deutscher Juden und der Nationalsozialismus. Fruehe Schriften 1930 bis 1939. Eine historische Dokumentation , Berlin 1970, p. 27. "Bereit fuer Deutschland!" was the Vortrupp's official sloganΓÇô "Was auch geschehe: Bereit fuer Deutschland!" Der Deutsche Vortrupp. Blaetter einer Gefolgschaft Deutscher Juden , No. 1 (October 1933), p. 2. In 1934 the Schwarzes Faehnlein had approximately 1,000 members. George L. Mosse, Germans and Jews. The Right, the Left, and the Search for a Third Force' in Pre-Nazi Germany , New York 1970, p. 104. For a study on the Vortrupp , see Carl J. Rheins, Deutscher Vortrupp, Gefolgschaft deutscher Juden 1933ΓÇô1935', in LBI Year Book XXVI (1981), pp. 207ΓÇô229. On the Verband nationaldeutscher Juden , see, by the same author, The Verband nationaldeutscher Juden 1921ΓÇô1933', in LBI Year Book XXV (1980), pp. 243ΓÇô268, and on the Schwarzes Faehnlein , also by Rheins, see The Schwarzes Faehnlein, Jungenschaft, 1932ΓÇô1934', in LBI Year Book XXIII (1978), pp. 173ΓÇô197. The history of the Reichsbund juedischer Frontsoldaten has been admirably traced by Ulrich Dunker, Der Reichsbund juedischer Frontsoldaten 1919ΓÇô1938. Geschichte eines juedischen Abwehrvereins , Duesseldorf 1977.
31.) I am indebted to Dr. Klaus Hermann of Sir George Williams University for making the programme of the Erneuerungsbewegung available to me.
32.) See Israelitisches Familienblatt , XXXV (30th November 1933); C.V Zeitung , XII (16th November 1933); Juedische Rundschau , XXXVIII (28th November 1933).
